China's rapid rise on the global economic stage has substantial and unequal employment and wage effects in advanced industrialised democracies given China's large volume of low-wage labour. Thus far, these effects have not been analysed in the comparative political economy literature. Building on pooled time-series data, we analyse the effects of Chinese trade competition across 17 sectors in 18 countries. We devote attention to a new channel, increased competition from China in foreign export markets. Our empirical findings reveal overall employment declines in sectors more exposed to Chinese imports. Furthermore, effects on wages and employment are not equally shared across skill levels. For the high-skilled, Chinese competition yields neutral or positive effects whilst the low-skilled bear the brunt. More generally, our findings provide new insights into how international trade, technological change, and labour market institutions contribute to the widely observed trend of rising inequality.
Introduction
During the past two decades China's manufacturing exports to advanced industrialised democracies have grown enormously. As a result of its liberalisation of product and financial markets, its growth in productivity, and its World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession in 2001, China became the world's largest exporter of goods in the span of two decades between early 1990s and 2010 (OECD 2012) . Given China's enormous volume of low-wage labour, illustrated by the massive rural-urban migration, its rapid exports growth can be considered as an export shock that can have substantial consequences for the wages and employment possibilities of employees in OECD countries.
Globalisation as such has a long history of being examined as a cause of rising earnings inequality in the comparative political economy literature. Studies tend to use imports and exports with less developed countries summed together as a percentage of GDP as indicator; most studies report insignificant associations between this measure and wage inequality (Pontusson et al. 2002; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Oliver 2008 ). Huber and Stephens (2014) do not find significant effects of total imports and exports as a percentage of GDP on wage inequality. Yet, these studies do not devote specific attention to China's rise on the global economic stage. In addition, trade is measured at the country level even though there are substantial differences in the degree to which sectors within countries are exposed to trade. Furthermore, an important theoretical channel through which trade has an impact on employment and wages is neglected.
Traditional measures of trade only capture direct linkages between trading partners. These approaches disregard that exporting sectors are also affected by the rise of China when foreign export markets switch to Chinese imports instead.
Recent studies in international economics and labour economics reveal strong distributive effects of the rise of China on the global economy in single-country studies. Autor et al. (2013) and Autor et al. (2015) find that rising Chinese import competition on U.S. labour markets has reduced employment and wages in manufacturing sectors. For Norway, Balsvik et al. (2015) find also negative employment effects, but no indications of wage effects. These authors attribute these dissimilarities in results to the lower flexibility of Norwegian labour market institutions compared to the U.S. Although these case studies insightfully depict country-specific developments, they do not allow for a general assessment of employment and wage effects of Chinese trade competition across a broader group of OECD countries with diverse political-economic institutions.
We aim to complement our existing knowledge of determinants of earnings inequality by analysing the developments in employment and wages in 17 sectors across 18 OECD countries between 1990 and 2007. This approach allows us to examine the distributive effects of Chinese trade competition, while we can account for institutions found to be relevant in the comparative political economy literature on wage inequality (e.g. Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Mahler 2004; Martin and Swank 2012) . With respect to this literature, we seek to make three contributions.
First, existing comparative political economy research pertains to distributive effects of international trade in general, but does not devote attention to effects of Chinese trade in particular. This is remarkable given the importance of earnings inequality in the real world politics. We empirically test to what extent increased Chinese trade competition provides an explanation for rising levels of inequality in Western countries (Bradley et al. 2003; OECD 2011a; Huber and Stephens 2014) .
Second, we extend our analysis of trade effects on the distribution of earnings by taking into account Chinese competition on foreign export markets. This route of trade competition has been neglected thus far in the existing inequality literature. Third, we take the sector as the unit of analysis. Exposure to international trade and therefore its labour market effects vary substantially across sectors (Scheve and Slaughter 2004; Hays et al. 2005; Walter 2010; Oesch 2013; Thewissen et al. 2013) . Our central hypothesis is that sectors with greater exposure to Chinese trade competition experience stronger labour market effects. Furthermore, our study is complementary to recent research on deindustrialisation in political science. We inspect the evolution of the manufacturing sectors in detail, whilst recent accounts mainly focus on developments in the services sectors (Rehm 2009; Ansell and Gingrich 2013; Wren 2013; Dancygier and Walter 2015) .
The paper is organised as follows. We begin by reviewing the literature and formulating hypotheses on the effects of Chinese trade competition, skill-biased technological change and labour market institutions on employment and earnings inequality. In the third section, we discuss the data and methods and specify the measure for Chinese export competition in foreign markets. Subsequently, the fourth section presents the results of the analysis. The fifth section summarises the main findings and concludes.
Literature and hypotheses
Our theoretical understanding of the distributive effects of Chinese exports is based on two standard trade models from international economics. In the Ricardo-Viner model, sectors are the central unit of analysis as it is assumed that factor mobility is limited.
Employees in sectors with higher exports as a result of the reduction of trade restrictions benefit, whereas employees in sectors with increased imports loose (Samuelson 1971; Hays 2009 ). In contrast, the Stolper-Samuelson model (1941) , in which factor mobility is assumed to be perfect, hinges on factor endowments. Owners of abundant production factors profit from trade.
Increased trade competition stemming from China may affect workers in OECD countries in two ways. First, Chinese imports in OECD countries can substitute the domestic production of goods, resulting in a reduced labour demand. Hence, it can be expected that sectors with more Chinese exports experience negative employment and wage effects. The findings of Autor et al. (2013) and Balsvik et al. (2015) for respectively the U.S. and Norway support this hypothesis. Second, Chinese exports may also affect sectors by generating increased competition in the foreign markets where sectors sell their products. As an example, it could be that a German manufacturer has a large market share in France, but that France substitutes German imports for Chinese products (Balsvik et al. 2015) . Thus, we hypothesise that the employment size of sectors more exposed to Chinese trade competition will shrink. Furthermore, we predict that employment and wage effects of Chinese trade competition are not equally shared across all workers. Given the relative abundance of low-skilled labour in China, mainly the low-skilled employees in exposed manufacturing sectors in OECD countries will be affected by Chinese exports. Therefore, we hypothesise that sectoral exposure to Chinese trade competition is associated with negative employment and wage effects for low-skilled employees. For high-skilled workers, however, expectations are less clear-cut. Based on an empirical analysis for the UK, Bloom et al. (forthcoming) find positive wage effects of Chinese trade competition for high-skilled workers. As more competition from China does not imply more exports to China, on the contrary, these positive effects are not an indication of the typical winners from the Stolper-Samuelson model. Instead, according to recent insights from international economics (e.g. Melitz 2003) , increased competition triggers firms to increase their productivity in order to survive. Indeed, Bloom et al. (forthcoming) find that Chinese trade competition has a positive impact on innovation and productivity. In order to achieve this, firms hire more high-skilled workers, leading to positive labour market effects in sectors that are more exposed to Chinese competition. Thus, we expect positive employment and wage effects, or less negative net effects, for high-skilled workers in sectors more exposed to Chinese competition.
Another explanation for rising levels of labour market inequality is the effect of so-called skill-biased technological change (Goldin and Katz 2008; Oesch 2013; Wren 2013 ). According to this argument, technological innovation complements the highskilled, whilst it substitutes routine labour by capital. The demand for high-skilled labour increases, leading to more employment opportunities and higher wages for highly educated workers. In contrast, the demand for low-skilled labour decreases, resulting in fewer jobs and lower wages for lowly educated workers. These effects of technological change are supported by various empirical studies on the U.S. (Autor et al. 2003; Goldin and Katz 2008) . Focusing on the labour market effects of information and communication technologies (ICT), Michaels et al. (2014) extend this empirical evidence to sectors in Japan and nine European countries.
Prompted by the fact that the theoretically predicted labour market effects of trade and technological change are rather similar, there has been a debate which of the two is most responsible for growing levels of inequality. A recent study on the U.S. by Autor et al. (2015) pushes this debate forward by showing that the effects of trade and technological change actually differ. The authors find that sectors with a greater exposure to trade competition experience overall declines in employment. In contrast, technological change yields neutral effects on overall employment, but substantial compositional effects within sectors, as low-skilled employment declines and highskilled employment grows. Hence, we expect that technological change has positive employment and wage effects for highly educated workers and negative employment and wage effects for lowly educated workers, without affecting the overall employment size of the exposed sector.
A third line of explanations for the variation in employment and wages, and one that is central in the current comparative political economy literature, emphasises the importance of labour market institutions. As employers and employees bargain over wages and other working conditions, the outcomes of these negotiations are a function of a country's system of labour relations and political power distributions (Kenworthy 2001; Martin and Swank 2012; Huber and Stephens 2014) . A first factor is the share of employees covered by wage bargaining agreements (Wallerstein 1999) . When more employees are covered by bargaining agreements, there is less variation in wages between workers. Hence, we expect bargaining coverage to be negatively associated with wage inequality.
In addition to the coverage, also the level of coordination of wage bargaining may affect labour market outcomes. In the wage inequality literature, the main hypothesis on this score is that countries with centralised systems of wage bargaining have a more compressed wage distribution. Centralised wage bargaining creates fewer and smaller wage differentials as more firms and industries are covered by the same wage settlements (Wallerstein 1999; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Mahler 2004 ). As the existing empirical evidence is based on country-level studies, it is an empirical question whether and how coordination affects wage inequality within sectors.
Moreover, the coordination of bargaining may also have employment effects.
High wage settlements may have adverse effects on employment if wages are not in line with productivity. Hence, as multiple sectors are involved in the bargaining, the resulting wage settlement may harm employment in low-productivity sectors (Iversen and Wren 1998) . On the other hand, it could also be expected that in highly coordinated bargaining systems, the employment implications of wage determination are taken into account more explicitly by unions and employment organisations as norms of fairness and solidarity become more dominant (Soskice 1991; Wallerstein 1999 ).
Furthermore, labour market outcomes may be influenced by employment protection legislation (EPL). EPL increases the gap between employees with a permanent contract (insiders) and employees without a permanent contract (outsiders).
The costs of dismissal increase with the strictness of EPL, which gives insiders bargaining power in wage setting (Lindbeck and Snower 2001; Rueda 2007) . Hence, we expect that the strictness of EPL is positively related to earnings inequality. Moreover, EPL might also yield distributive effects between skill groups. Because of a substantial component of fixed costs, EPL protects low-skilled workers more than high-skilled workers (Koeniger et al. 2007 ).
Finally, the political ideology of governments might also have an impact on the wage dispersion. In the wage inequality literature, two effects are highlighted. First, since governments are extensively involved in private-sector wage setting in many advanced industrial countries, the ideology of governments might have a direct effect on wage inequality. Hence, left-wing governments can be expected to pursue greater wage inequality than liberal or conservative governments (Wallerstein 1999) . A second and more indirect argument is that governments might influence wages and employment through minimum wage legislation, taxes, and other forms of income policies. Again, it may be expected that left-wing governments adopt policies that lead to less inequality (Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Pontusson et al. 2002; Oliver 2008) .
Data, measures and method

Dependent variable
To examine the labour market effects of import and export competition at the sectoral level across countries and over time, we use multiple data sources. First, we analyse sectoral employment effects, using the relative employment size. This measure is defined as the number of employees in a sector divided by the number of employees in the national economy. Data are taken from the EU-KLEMS database (2011) Table A1 in the appendix for the ISIC codes. We leave out total manufacturing; and manufacturing of chemical, rubber, plastics, and fuel products (23t25) in our descriptives and regressions to avoid having sectoral overlap, as we include all constituent sectors separately. 3 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, the UK, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the US. 4 The beginning is set by data availability on imports from China and the end is due to data availability from EU-KLEMS. Information on shares of hours worked per skill group is only available up to and including 2004.
(1)
Measuring Chinese trade competition
For our measure of exposure to Chinese import competition, we follow existing sectoral studies (Mahler et al. 1999; Michaels et al. 2013) and measure this as the value of the total imported goods as a share of the value added for sector i in country j in year t. This measure is the sectoral equivalent of imports as a share of GDP at the country level. 5 Data on imports come from the OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database (2011b) and value added is taken from EU-KLEMS (2011).
To capture the Chinese competition in foreign markets p to which sectors export their goods, export competition for sector i in country j at time t is measured as follows:
The second part of equation 1 measures the difference in exports from the sector type i of China and country j to country p, relative to the total exports -from all countries -of sector type i to country p. 6 Hence, this measure indicates the difference between the export market shares of the sectors i from China and country j in country p.
Subsequently, the pressure from the Chinese competition in the foreign market p depends on the relative importance of foreign market p for sector i in country j.
Therefore, the competition in foreign market p is weighted by the first term of equitation 1, which is the value of the exported goods from sector i in country j to country p divided by the total exports of sector i in country j. 7 An advantage of the export competition 5 As a simple test we calculate the correlation between total imports in value added at the country level from our database and imports of goods and services in percentages of GDP from World Bank National Accounts. The correlation is 0.93, with a comparable mean (32.0 versus 35.2 from the World Bank) and standard deviation (both 17.5). 6 We restrict our analysis to 59 partner countries as data for other countries contain too many missings. We calculate Chinese exports to each of the 59 partner countries at the sectoral level for our sample of countries individually as follows. We collect both export data reported by China at the sectoral level, and import data reported by each of the 59 partner countries at the sectoral level. The correlation between the two is 0.99. To maximise data availability, we first interpolate both time series. Next, we extrapolate the export data from China using the trend in import data from the separate partner countries. As a final check we calculate the percentage of (unweighted) values at the country partner sector year level larger than +1 and smaller than -1. These numbers would be the result of data differences in the combination of bilateral trade from multiple reporting countries, as it is substantively impossible that the difference between Chinese and home country's exports to a partner's sector divided by total exports to this partner's sector is larger than 1. The 0.2 per cent of all observations for which this is the case are changed to missings. 7 We make two amendments to this weighting factor to make sure it adds to 1 at the sector country year level. First, we multiply the weighting factor by the difference between total country exports and the sum of country exports to each individual country, since we 'only' collect data for 59 countries rather than to all countries. Second, for each measure used in this study over the measures used by Autor et al. (2013) and Balsvik et al. (2015) , is that our measure accounts for the temporal variation in the exports from sector i in country j, whereas the other measures only include the initial market share of this sector. For the export competition measure, sectoral data from the OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database are collected for 59 partner countries p, including all OECD countries, all European countries, the BRIICS, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and
Thailand, which amounts to little over half a million observations, covering around 85
per cent of all imports for our sample of countries.
In Figure 1 we display our measures of import competition and competition in foreign export markets graphically. As an example, we take an industry in Germany. The double lined arrow on the right-hand side pointing upwards shows the exposure to import competition for this industry, coming from (direct) imports from China. The pivoted arrows on the left-hand side together show the amount of export competition.
The two solid arrows are the exports from the German and Chinese sector industry to the same industry in the Netherlands. The difference between these Chinese and German exports to the Netherlands, weighted by total exports to the Netherlands, measures the amount of export competition the German sector experiences from China in the Netherlands. This is calculated for more countries, such as France (the dashed lines), and 57 other countries (the dotted lines).
indicator separately we correct for missing trade information from a partner country, which is only a minor adjustment (the correlation between the corrected and uncorrected series is above 0.97). 
Other independent variables
To account for effects of skill-biased technological change on employment and wages, we follow Michaels et al. (2014) , Massari et al. (2013) , and Wren (2013) and include ICT capital compensation as a share of sectoral value added from the EU-KLEMS dataset (2011). 8 We include two measures to account for wage-setting institutions, namely the bargaining coverage, which is defined as the proportion of employees covered by wage bargaining agreements, and the level of wage coordination. 9 Both measures are taken from the ICTWSS database (Visser et al. 2013) . 10 As a measure for the strictness of employment protection legislation, the EPL index from the OECD (2014a) is included. To analyse the impact of left-wing governments, we use the percentage of total cabinet 8 As Michaels et al. (2014) also note, since capital compensation is calculated as a residual, it could be negative. We replace values by zeros if negative (3 per cent of total observations). We calculate the indicator by multiplying ICT capital compensation as a share of total capital compensation by capital compensation, and divide this by value added, where we have placed capital compensation and value added in real dollars using OECD information on exchange rates. We have to use the EU-KLEMS March 2008 version for Portugal. 9 We linearly interpolate the bargaining coverage rate. 10 For Ireland there are only 3 observations available for bargaining coverage in the fourth version of ICTWSS; the first observation is for 2000. We use the third ICTWSS version for this country and we interpolated the data. The correlation between the linearly interpolated series from the third and fourth version for the 9 overlapping observations is 0.89.
posts held by left-wing parties from the Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon et al. 2012 ). Furthermore, employment and wages may be affected by cyclical dynamics. To control for these dynamics, we include a number of variables. At the sectoral level, we include the volume of gross value added. Data are taken from the EU-KLEMS dataset (2011). For more general economic conditions at the country level, we include the unemployment rate. As low-skilled workers are more substitutable than high-skilled workers, the bargaining position of low-skilled workers is more directly and more disadvantageously affected by unemployment (Pontusson et al. 2002) . Hence, unemployment can be expected to be positively associated with earnings inequality.
Unemployment rates are taken from the OECD (2014b) Labour Force Statistics. Finally, we include real GDP per capita from the OECD (2014c) National Accounts.
Last, we include a measure of total imports excluding Chinese imports as a share of sectoral value added to account for the effect of other imports. Chinese imports and total imports excluding Chinese imports are substantively and empirically distinct, as indicated by a low correlation (0.14) and a much more rapid average rise of Chinese imports (15.2 instead of 2.0 per cent on average per year for our sample).
Method
An important issue in the analysis of time-series cross-section data is non-stationarity.
Indeed, we find evidence for non-stationarity of our main variables. 11 The study relies on an error correction model, in which changes of the dependent variable are regressed on the lagged levels and the changes of the independent variables. Such a model is better able to cope with non-stationarity than specifications in levels only (Beck 1991; De Boef and Keele 2008) . Given the nature of the data in many studies in comparative political economy, it is a conventional estimator in the field (Iversen and Cusack 2000; Ansell and Gingrich 2013; Wren et al. 2013) . In an error correction model, the lagged levels capture the long-term structural effects, whereas the changes capture the short-term transitory effects (Podestà 2006) . Hence, the estimated equation is:
∆y ijt = α 0 + α 1 y ijt−1 + β 0 ∆x ijt + β 1 x ijt−1 + β 2 z it−1 + ε ijt
Here, Δyijt denotes the first difference in the dependent variable in sector i in country j and year t; α0 is the intercept and ε is the error term. For the vector of independent variables x the short-term effects are indicated by β0. The long-term effects are indicated by β1/-α1.
To analyse the data, the study relies on OLS regression analyses. The main model does not include sector or country fixed effects, since the inclusion of both a lagged dependent variable and unit dummies renders the estimator inconsistent (Nickell 1991) .
Nevertheless, estimating the model with sector or country dummies generally replicates the main results. Despite the fact that the lagged dependent variable absorbs autocorrelation in the error term, Breusch-Godfrey tests indicate that there is still autocorrelation left. Therefore, the error term is specified to follow a panel-specific AR (1) process. In addition, we use panel-corrected standard errors to correct for panelheteroskedasticity and contemporaneous spatial correlation (Beck and Katz 2011) .
Empirical analysis
Employment effects
The results of estimation of employment effects are presented in Table 2 . Model 1 starts with the analysis of the relative employment size of a sector, defined as the number of people working in a sector divided by people working in the national economy. As this ratio sums to one for each country-year observation, we leave out country-level variables as they lose their interpretation. 12 The results indicate that Chinese imports are negatively associated with the employment size. 13 This result provides empirical support for the hypothesis that imported Chinese goods substitute domestically produced goods leading to negative employment effects. The employment effects of total imports excluding Chinese imports are comparable but smaller. Exposure to Chinese export competition seems to have a negative effect on overall employment, but only in the short run as the coefficient for the lagged level is not significant. 12 Our results hardly change when we include the labour market institutions: import competition becomes insignificant whilst export competition becomes significant. 13 Our main results do not change when we restrict our analysis to the 3777 observations for which we also have information on share of hours worked per skill group. Total excluding Chinese imports become insignificant.
As expected, Models 2 and 3 show that the negative employment effects from Chinese competition mainly impinge on low-skilled workers. For these workers, there is a negative effect of Chinese imports and Chinese export competition on their hours worked. This means that in sectors that are exposed to strong competition from China, there is less work for lowly educated workers. Interestingly, the results show different effects for highly educated workers in these sectors. The hours worked by highly educated workers are not significantly affected by Chinese imports and they are positively affected by exposure to Chinese competition in foreign export markets. In line with our expectation based on Bloom et al (2015) , these results suggest that in response to the increased competition, firms seek to increase their productivity and highly educated workers benefit from this. In the case of Chinese imports, this positive effect stemming from the increasing productivity compensates the negative overall employment size effect for the highly educated workers. As a result, the net effect for the highly educated workers is not significant. In the case of the Chinese competition in foreign markets, in contrast, the data do not indicate a negative employment size effect for the whole sector and the productivity increases result in a positive net effect for highly educated workers.
With respect to technological change, the results indicate that there is no significant association between technological change and the employment size of sectors. Nevertheless, technological change is negatively related to the share of hours worked by lowly educated workers and it is positively related to the share of hours worked by highly educated workers. Taken together, these results lend support to the argument that technological change alters the composition of employment within sectors rather than the overall employment size of sectors. In sectors with greater skillbiased technological change, the number of low-skilled jobs declined whilst the number of high-skilled job increased.
As to the institutional variables, EPL is positively associated with the share of hours worked by lowly educated workers, whereas it is negatively associated with the share of working hours of the highly educated workers. In line with our expectation, these results indicate that EPL provides more protection for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled workers. For the coordination of wage bargaining, we find a negative association with the share of working hours of low-skilled workers. The coverage of wage bargaining and the political ideology of governments do not yield significant employment effects.
Turning to the economic control variables, the unemployment rate is negatively associated with the share of hours worked by low-skilled workers, whereas it is not significantly associated with the share of hours worked by high-skilled workers. These results are in line with the theoretical argument that unemployment affects the labour market position of low-skilled workers more adversely than the position of high-skilled workers. Furthermore, the results provide some evidence for positive employment effects of the value added and GDP per capita. Table 3 presents the results of the regression analyses of wage bill shares. Exposure to Chinese export competition is negatively associated with the wages of low skilled workers, whereas it is positively associated with the wages of high skilled workers. In line with the results for the employment effects, these results indicate that sectors with great exposure to Chinese export competition face substantial distributive effects.
Wage effects
Furthermore, Chinese imports do not reach significance in these analyses. This suggests that Chinese imports sort employment effects rather than wage effects, as we expected from our theoretical section for our set of countries with more rigid labour market institutions (Balsvik et al. 2015) .
For technological change, the results indicate a negative effect for low-skilled workers and a positive effect for high-skilled workers. As expected, skill-biased technological change increases the differences in wages between lowly and highly educated workers. As to EPL, the results suggest that it is mainly the low-skilled workers who benefit from the increased bargaining power. The results for the unemployment rate correspond to the estimations of the employment effects. Low-skilled workers are more severely affected by high levels of unemployment and this culminates in negative wage effects. 
Sensitivity analysis
We perform a number of additional tests to examine the robustness of our results. First, we account for other emerging economies to examine the uniqueness of the Chinese trade competition. The sum of imports from India, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, and
Thailand -which is lower and grew less than the imports from China -is never significant in the regressions and it does not affect our main results. Apparently, the magnitude of the imports from other emerging economies is too small (still) to find any effects with regression analysis.
Furthermore, the rise of the Chinese economy may not only increase the competition for sectors in OECD countries, it may also increase the exports of these sectors to China, which could have positive employment effects. To account for these effects, we use two measures, namely the exports to China and the net imports from China, defined as imports from China minus exports to China. The coefficients for exports to China are never significant, and also employing net imports leads to comparable findings as presented above.
Another aspect of globalisation that might have distributive consequences are the increased international flows of capital, although the economic theory on such effects is less developed (Mahler 2004 ; but see Burgoon and Raess 2014) . As in other recent inequality studies (e.g. Michaels et al. 2014) , capital flows are not included in our main analyses, because there is only limited bilateral data on capital at the sectoral level.
Utilising the limited data available (OECD, 2014d), we run regressions with the total foreign direct (FDI) investment positions, inflows, and outflows. None of these variables reaches significance, nor does including these variables affect our main results.
Finally, based on the insights from the varieties of capitalism literature (Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Hall and Gingerich 2009) , it might be expected that domestic labour market institutions play an intermediating role in the wage and employment effects of international trade. That is, international trade could be expected to sort greater effects in flexible labour markets. Therefore, we analysed interaction effects between bargaining coverage, bargaining coordination and EPL on the one hand and our trade competition variables on the other. None of the results for these interaction effects were significant.
Conclusions
With the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy, the international trade arena has changed substantially for manufacturing sectors in Western countries in the last two decades. Despite the fact that this surge of China has been subject of debate in many political arenas, to date it has not received much attention in comparative political economy on inequality. We contribute to our understanding of the effects of Chinese trade competition by analysing employment and wage effects for a broad set of advanced industrialised democracies. We use sectoral measures of Chinese trade competition between 1990 and 2007 for 18 countries. Moreover, we include a measure that taps into export competition stemming from China.
Accounting for institutional variation across countries, our analysis shows employment declines in sectors that are more exposed to imports from China. Existing studies report distributive effects of Chinese imports on employment levels in the U.S.
and Norway, whilst wage effects are only found in the U.S. (Autor et al. 2013; Balsvik et al. 2015) . Our study generalises these findings to a set of 18 OECD countries with diverse labour market institutions. The results suggest that Chinese import competition generates employment effects rather than wage effects.
Furthermore, effects on wages and employment are not equally shared across skill levels, as we hypothesised. The lowly educated workers bear the brunt of the substitution of domestic production by Chinese imports. These distributive effects are even clearer shown by the results for the increased competition from China in foreign export markets. Sectors with greater exposure to export competition experience declines in employment and wages for low-skilled workers and rises in employment and wages for high-skilled workers. The production work of low-skilled workers is substituted by Chinese exports, resulting in a lower demand for low-skilled labour. For the high-skilled workers, our results tend to support earlier findings for the United Kingdom indicating that stronger competition triggers innovation and productivity increasing activities in exporting sectors, which increases the demand and so employment and wages for high-skilled workers (Bloom et al. forthcoming) . A wider implication of these results seems to be that current studies where competition for exporting sectors is neglected leads to underestimation of the distributional effects of trade competition.
Skill-biased technological change is often put forward as an additional determinant of rising earnings dispersion. We find neutral effects of technological change on the overall employment size of sectors. However, in sectors with greater technological innovation, we find negative employment and wage effects for low-skilled workers and positive employment and wage effects for high-skilled workers.
Interestingly, these findings suggest that the effects of Chinese trade competition in the U.S. which have recently been found by Autor et al. (2015) also apply to other OECD countries. Technological change has merely distributive consequences, whereas international trade is also related to overall declines in employment.
More generally, our study stresses the importance of considering the substantial differences between Chinese imports and overall globalisation, and the large variation in exposure across sectors. Theoretically, we would expect trade competition from China to have particularly strong distributive effects given its large volume of low-wage labour. Our empirical evidence supports this. Interestingly, the analysis shows overall employment declines in sectors more exposed to Chinese imports, whereas a comparable result has not been found for the increased Chinese competition in foreign markets. This puzzling finding should be scrutinized further in following studies.
Furthermore, our sectoral approach acknowledges the substantial sectoral variation in wages and employment on the one hand, and the exposure to Chinese imports and technological change on the other. Hence, a sectoral approach seems to be a fruitful direction for the analysis of the determinants of the widely observed trend of increasing inequality across OECD countries over the past decades. Future research could shed more light on employment shifts between sectors when detailed micro-level panel data becomes available. 
